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Loss of Consortium and the Unmarried 
Cohabitant: Bulloch v. United States 
Traditionally, American courts have confined the tort action 
of loss of consortium to a husband's interest in the consortium 
of his wife.' The grounds for this restriction have not been 
clear,' and in recent years many jurisdictions have recognized a 
wife's equal interest in the consortium of her hu~band.~  At- 
tempts to extend the action beyond marriage have met with lit- 
tle succe~s.~ However, in Bulloch v. United States/ the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey expanded 
the action's boundaries and allowed an unmarried cohabitant to 
sue for the loss of her partner's consortium. 
On May 21, 1977, David K. Bulloch was injured in a scuba 
diving accident off the coast of New Jersey. Three months ear- 
lier David and his wife, Edith, had divorced after twenty-six 
years of marriage. In spite of their divorce, the Bullochs regu- 
larly communicated, and by the time of the accident the couple 
had reconciled their differences, had decided to resume living to- 
gether, and planned ultimately to remarry. Upon David's release 
from the hospital the Bullochs began living together and discov- 
ered the accident had rendered David impotent. They did not 
remarry, however, because they believed a formal marriage 
would not be legally binding unless it could be consummated. 
Nevertheless, the Bullochs held themselves out as husband and 
wife and considered themselves married. Subsequently, David 
Bulloch filed suit against the United States under the Federal 
1. See Foster, Relational Interests of the Family, 1962 U .  ILL. L.F. 493,494; Green, 
Relational Interests, 29 Nw. U.L. REV. 460,465-66 (1934); Holbrook, The Change in the 
Meaning of Consortium, 22 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2 (1923); Pound, Individual Interests in the 
Domestic Relations, 14 MICH. L. REV. 177, 193-94 (1916). 
2. Holbrook, supra note 1, at 2-4. 
3. Comment, Loss of Consortium and Unmarried Cohabitors: An Examination of 
Tong v. Jocson, 14 U.S.F.L. REV. 133, 137 n.35 (1979). 
4. See Chiesa v. Rowe, 486 F. Supp. 236 (W.D. Mich. 1980); Tong v. Jocson, 76 Cal. 
App. 3d 603, 142 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1977); Sawyer v. Bailey, 413 A.2d 165 (Me. 1980). 
5. 487 F. Supp. 1078 (D.N.J. 1980). 
438 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I981 
Tort Claims Act6 and the Suits in Admiralty Act: and he was 
joined by Edith, who claimed damages for loss of con~ortium.~ 
The government moved to dismiss Edith's claim, arguing 
that marriage is a prerequisite to a loss of consortium action, but 
the court denied the motion and held that Edith Bulloch quali- 
fied as a plaintiff in the action? In an effort to resolve the case 
in accordance with New Jersey law, the district court grappled 
with a number of possible theories behind the consortium action 
and finally anchored its decision on the New Jersey policy of 
extending tort actions to justly compensate injured parties.1° 
This policy was expressed in Ekalo u. Constructive Service 
Corp. of America,ll a case in which the New Jersey Supreme 
Court extended the action for loss of consortium to include the 
wife as a plaintiff. In Ekalo the court rejected the view held by 
some jurisdictions that the consortium action should be abol- 
ished altogether rather than extended" and stated that, absent 
sufficient countervailing policy considerations, tort actions 
should be broadened to justly compensate proximately injured 
parties." The Bulloch court recognized that New Jersey had 
previously declined to create an action for children similar to 
loss of consortium14 but determined that the policy considera- 
tions which led to that result were inapplicable to unmarried co- 
habitants? Finding no reasons to limit the consortium action to 
6. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680 (1976). 
7. 46 U.S.C. 5 741 (1976). 
8. 487 F. Supp. at 1079. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. at 1082-86. The court focused on three possible purposes for the consortium 
action. First, the court considered the action as a means for penalizing unmarried cohab- 
itants for not marrying. Deciding that New Jersey did not intend to punish cohabitants 
by denying them the action, the court rejected this view. Secondly, the court viewed the 
action as a tool used by the state to encourage marriage. In discarding this theory, the 
court noted it was unlikely people marry in order to have a loss of consortium action. 
Finally, the court accepted the position that the purpose behind the consortium action 
was to compensate those proximately injured by the tortious acts of others. Id. 
11. 46 N.J. 82, 215 A.2d 1 (1965). 
12. Id. at 93, 215 A.2d at 7. 
13. Id. at 95, 215 A.2d at 8. 
14. 487 F. Supp. at 1086 (citing Russell v. Salem Transp. Co., 61 N.J. 502, 295 A.2d 
862 (1972)). 
15. The court limited its search for countervailing policies to those discussed in Rus- 
sell v. Salem Transp. Co., 61 N.J. 502, 295 A.2d 862 (1972), in which the court denied a 
consortium-like claim by children. In that case the New Jersey court focused on 
problems of increased tort liability, double recovery, remoteness, and speculativeness of 
damages. The Bulloch court concluded these problems did not exist in the case of un- 
married cohabitants. First, the court stated, since the extension to unmarried cohabi- 
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marriage and characterizing consortium as a relational interest 
that can exist outside of marriage, the court expanded the con- 
sortium boundaries to include any "person who, as a result of 
tortious conduct, loses services, aid, comfort and conjugal fellow- 
ship of the type typically shared by spouses."16 
The Bulloch court failed to recognize two significant reasons 
not to extend the consortium action. First, shifting the consor- 
tium line from the objective test of marriage to an inherently 
subjective test would thrust courts into an unwieldy case-by-case 
evaluation of personal interests using uncertain and elusive stan- 
dards. Secondly, such a shift ignores the differences between the 
interests of married and unmarried persons in their respective 
relationships. 
If recovery is to be granted for third-party harm to personal 
relationships, courts must have some guidelines to determine 
which relationships actually deserve compensation. Arguably, 
the courts could recognize harm to each type of sentimental re- 
lationship, using the quality of the relationship merely as a fac- 
tor in awarding damages. However, such a course would increase 
tort liability to a staggering degree and could fill the courts with 
frivolous claims. For example, under this approach an accident 
would not only leave the tortfeasor liable to the victim and his 
spouse, it would also leave the courtroom door open to the vic- 
tim's relatives, friends, neighbors, and acquaintances. For this 
reason, courts have carefully limited recognition of relational 
harm.17 
Bulloch implicitly acknowledged the need to limit recovery 
to deserving relationships; however, the court departed from the 
traditional boundaries of consortium, asserting that some un- 
marrieds may suffer harm identical to that suffered by spouses. 
tants involved the addition of only one companion claim, there was no danger of sub- 
stantially expanding tort liability. Secondly, the court considered the fear of double 
recovery unfounded in Bulloch because juries do not assume the presence of a cohabiting 
partner when awarding damages and so do not include the partner's suffering to any 
extent. Finally, the court felt that problems of remoteness and speculativeness of dam- 
ages did not outweigh the need for compensation because the Ekalo court had held that 
such injuries are proximately caused by tortious injury to the spouse and damages would 
be no more speculative in the case of unmarried cohabitants than in the case of husband 
and wife. 487 F. Supp. at 1086-87. 
16. 487 F. Supp. at 1088. 
17. See generally Foster, note 1 supra; Green, note 1 supra; Pound, note 1 supra. 
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Therefore, rather than fixing the borders of recognized interests 
at a well-marked legal relationship, the court created an elusive 
line defined by the quality of a party's expectations and inter- 
ests in any given relationship. Stating merely that judges and 
juries can undoubtedly separate "wheat from ch&,"18 the court 
gave no guidelines by which to determine that a party's frus- 
trated expectations rise to the level of losses "typically shared 
by spouses." Must one have an expectation in the services, aid, 
comfort, and sexual relations of another before damage to any 
one of those expectations is compensable? Is an expectation in 
the sexual relations of another party essential to the action? If 
so, does harm to homosexual relations also qualify for compensa- 
tion? If not, may close friends who expect services, aid, and 
comfort but not sexual relations also be entitled to recovery? 
What if one party's expectations do not coincide with those of 
the other party-which party's expectations determine the qual- 
ity of the relationship? Such questions illustrate the difficulty of 
administering a line which hinges on subjective judgments about 
personal relationships and individual expectations.lS 
This shift from clarity to ambiguity was apparently 
prompted by the perceived injustice of refusing Edith Bulloch's 
claim. However, the drawing of legal lines necessarily leaves 
some parties so close to the line that not allowing their claims 
appears unfair. This is true no matter where the line is drawn. 
Shifting the line to include those close to it only moves the 
boundaries of recognized interests and brings another group 
close to the line. The Bulloch court tried to avoid this problem 
by defining the line by the nature of the loss suffered rather 
than the type of relationship involved. This solution has the vir- 
tue of eliminating a seemingly arbitrary bar to recovery; how- 
ever, it also effectively eliminates line-drawing altogether leaving 
the court to struggle with the cumbersome process of adjudicat- 
ing interests in innumerable relationships. 
It is doubtful that any attempt to draw the consortium 
boundaries around sentimental relationships which are not also 
18. 487 F. Supp. at 1088. 
19. The problems of subjective analysis in the consortium area are certainly not 
new. Even within the clearly marked boundaries of marriage, subjectivity is required to 
determine the amount of harm to the relationship. However, subjective judgments in the 
awarding of damages do not bring with them the problems of unlimited liability and 
frivolous claims that accompany a subjective approach to determining qualified 
plaintiffs. 
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well-defined legal relationships will result in a line that can be 
objectively administered. Personal relationships vary so greatly 
in content and form that accurate assumptions about the expec- 
tations of unmarried cohabitants as a group cannot be made. On 
the other hand, accurate and justifiable assumptions can be 
made about expectations within marriage. Marriage differs from 
the relationship shared by unmarried cohabitants in that marital 
expectations are accompanied by legal commitment. Marriage 
entails a legally and socially recognized commitment to furnish 
such things as service, aid, comfort, and sexual relations to one's 
spouse. Although it is impossible to enforce these personal obli- 
gation~,'~ the existence of such a commitment permits the court 
to assume that but for the tortious conduct of a third party 
those promises would be kept. Unmarried cohabitants, by choos- 
ing to forego formal marriage, indicate their commitment to the 
relationship is not as serious as that in marriage. Since relation- 
ships outside of marriage are not surrounded by such serious 
commitments, the justifiable expectations parties to non-marital 
relationships have in the future companionship of their partners 
do not rise to the level of marital expectations. Because the con- 
sortium action assumes the aggrieved party has a right to expect 
the continued enjoyment of his or her partner's consortium, the 
element of marital commitment provides the courts with both a 
workable and logical place to draw the action's boundaries. 
In limiting the action for loss of consortium to marriage, 
courts have implicitly recognized the distinctions between mar- 
ried and unmarried relationships. Generally, courts have viewed 
the right of consortium as "grow[ing] out of the marriage rela- 
tionship,'"' and consortium has basically come to represent the 
legal and social incidents of marriage.aa According to one court, 
the right of consortium arises because of the duties and obliga- 
tions both husband and wife take upon themselves in marriage.2s 
Most recently the concept of consortium springing from mar- 
riage has been reatlirmed by a number of courts dealing with 
20. Professor Clark maintains rights of consortium within marriage are enforced in- 
directly. "Divorce is one such way. The spouse who does not live up to his obligations in 
specified respects may find himself the losing defendant in a divorce action." H. CLARK, 
THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 5 10.1, at 262 (1968). 
21. Sawyer v. Bailey, 413 A.2d 165, 166 (Me. 1980). See 1 F. HARPER & F. J-, 
THE LAW OF TORTS 5 8.9 (1956); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 5 124, at 
874 (4th ed. 1971). 
22. H. C L A ~ ,  supra note 20, at 261. 
23. Harris v. Kunkel, 227 Wis. 435, 437, 278 N.W. 868, 869 (1938). 
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loss of consortium claims by parties not married at the time of 
the accident." In denying these claims, the courts emphasized 
that the interests involved in a consortium action exist only 
within the marriage relationship. The Bulloch court stands vir- 
tually alone in its treatment of consortium as a relational inter- 
est that can exist outside of marriage. This is largely because in 
Bulloch the court ignored the heightened interest the marital 
commitment creates and merely declared it "obvious that a 
member of a cohabiting couple can suffer identical damage to 
that suffered by a spouse."26 Thus, not only is the Bulloch line 
unworkable, but it also is based on an assumption that has been 
constructively rejected by most other courts. 
In extending the loss of consortium action beyond marriage, 
the Bulloch court neglected the distinctions between married 
and unmarried persons and failed to consider the problems in- 
volved in moving the consortium boundaries from the objective 
test of marriage to the elusive subjective test of "typical loss." 
The court should have denied Edith Bulloch's claim and con- 
fined the action to the marriage relationship, which provides 
both a judicially workable and logically justifiable place to set 
the bounds of consortium. 
Paul D. Ellsworth 
24. See Chiesa v. Rowe, 486 F. Supp. 236 (W.D. Mich. 1980); Tong v. Jocson, 76 Cal. 
App. 3d 603, 142 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1977); Sawyer v. Bailey, 413 A.2d 165 (Me. 1980). 
25. 487 F. Supp. at 1085. 
